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ABSTRACT
In Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, the
Supreme Court handed down its seventh personal jurisdiction decision in the
last ten years. Ford—involving two consolidated state-court products liability
suits alleging defects in the defendants’ cars that injured forum-state residents
in their home states—is the only case in the Supreme Court’s decade-long spate
of jurisdictional decisions to find the minimum contacts test satisfied. In this
Article, we examine all three opinions of the case. Ford is a welcome return to
serious consideration of the fairness of the assertion of jurisdiction. Unlike its
six immediate predecessors, Ford considers not only the burden on the defendant
in asserting jurisdiction, but also the unfairness to the plaintiff if the Court were
to not allow jurisdiction. That said, Ford leaves open many important questions,
which we explore. The consequences of the majority’s splitting the “arise out of
or relate to” test for specific jurisdiction are not entirely clear. It remains an
open question as to under what circumstances a non-causal relationship will
suffice and when the presumably more demanding “arise out of” test must be
met. We explore several hypothetical factual scenarios in which jurisdiction
would depend on which formulation of relatedness is employed.
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INTRODUCTION
After ignoring the topic for twenty-one years, the Supreme Court
rediscovered personal jurisdiction in 2011. 1 Since then, it has decided seven
personal jurisdiction cases. 2 The biggest development in this “new generation”
of cases concerns general (or “all-purpose”) 3 jurisdiction, which permits a court
to entertain claims against the defendant no matter where they arise. In three
cases, the Court, without explanation, profoundly restricted the availability of
general jurisdiction based upon minimum contacts. 4 This restriction did more
than change the law of general jurisdiction. It drove a significant change in the
nature of the inquiry required in many specific jurisdiction cases.
Specific (or “case-linked”) 5 jurisdiction permits a court to hear claims that
are connected in some appropriate way to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum. 6 For over half a century, the Court’s near-singular focus in specific
jurisdiction cases was whether a defendant had forged relevant contacts with the
forum in which it was sued. In several decisions from Hanson v. Denckla 7 in
1957 through Walden v. Fiore 8 in 2014, the Court found that defendants lacked
contacts sufficient to satisfy what had emerged as the prime requirement for
personal jurisdiction in its iconic International Shoe Co. v. Washington9
decision. 10
1
Before this recent spate, the Court’s last personal jurisdiction decision was Burnham v. Superior Court
of California. 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (upholding “tag” jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction based on personal service
in the forum state).
2
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
3
This term was introduced by Justice Ginsburg in Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
4
BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1558–60; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929. Jurisdiction based
upon the traditional grounds of in-state service, domicile, or consent is also all-purpose jurisdiction and was not
affected by these cases.
5
This term was introduced in Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
6
Id.
7
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
8
571 U.S. 277 (2014).
9
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10
The Court found specific jurisdiction lacking because of insufficient purposeful contacts several times
in this period. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886–87 (2011); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977). In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Justices
split four-to-four on whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum were sufficient to support specific
jurisdiction. 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987). Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, said that he would be “inclined” to
find that the sale of 100,000 units (motorcycle tire valves) in the forum state would constitute purposeful
availment but refused to commit because it was unnecessary to the result. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring
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Now, however, the Court encounters a new generation of specific
jurisdiction cases. Here, the defendant has forged significant purposeful contacts
with the forum 11—enough to support general jurisdiction under the old law. But
because general jurisdiction no longer applies, plaintiffs must rely on specific
jurisdiction. And here we see the shift in focus: from whether the defendant has
sufficient contacts with the forum to whether the plaintiff’s claim is
appropriately connected to those contacts. 12 In common parlance, the shift is
from “contacts” to “relatedness.”
The Court has attempted to define and apply the relatedness requirement
only twice; both times in its most recent specific jurisdiction cases: BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California (BMS) 13 in 2017 and, on
March 25, 2021, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
(Ford). 14 Interestingly, Ford is in tension with BMS in significant ways. 15
Moreover, although the Court upheld state-court jurisdiction unanimously in
Ford, 16 the fissures that have divided Justices in past personal jurisdiction cases
are evident. Unlike some important jurisdictional cases, 17 Ford produced a
majority opinion, albeit with only five Justices signing it. 18 Justice Kagan
authored the majority opinion; Justice Alito wrote a solo concurrence in the
judgment; and Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, authored another
concurrence in the judgment. 19
In this Article, after briefly recounting the development of personal
jurisdiction law, we consider the importance of the separate opinions in Ford:
the majority’s, Justice Alito’s, and Justice Gorsuch’s. We then offer some
observations on questions left open, the consequences of the decision, and the
current state of the methodology to be applied in specific jurisdiction cases.

in part and concurring in the judgment).
11
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2021).
12
Id. at 1023.
13
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1773 (2017).
14
141 S. Ct. at 1031–32.
15
See infra Part II.
16
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1021, 1032. The decision was 8-0, with Justice Barrett not participating.
17
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495
U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
18
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022.
19
Id.; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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THE ROAD TO FORD

International Shoe instructed courts to consider several factors in assessing
personal jurisdiction. Principal among them were two: (1) the defendant’s
contacts with the forum and (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would be fair or reasonable under the circumstances. 20 In the 1950s, the Court
melded these two factors in a mélange approach. 21 That practice ended in 1980
when the Court established a rigid two-step approach in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 22
First, there must be relevant contacts between the defendant and the forum. 23
The contacts must result from “purposeful availment”—that is, from the
defendant’s own efforts at affiliation (and not the “unilateral activity of [a third
party]”). 24 Without at least one such contact, there can be no jurisdiction.
Second, only after such a contact is found does a court assess whether
jurisdiction is fair or reasonable. 25 In this regard, the Court established five
“fairness factors,” which it has never retracted. 26 After World-Wide Volkswagen
and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 27 the fairness assessment can defeat
jurisdiction but cannot create jurisdiction in the absence of a relevant contact,
although perhaps the factors can nudge a court toward finding jurisdiction in a
close case.
Because of the two-step approach, for decades many defendants have put all
their eggs in the contacts basket, arguing that their affiliation with the forum was
not purposeful. In case after case the Court agreed, 28 reaching its low ebb for
considering the reasonableness of jurisdiction in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–24 (1957); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 645–48 (1950).
22
444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1984). The Court suggested this rigid approach in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 251, 253 (1958), but state and lower federal courts did not embrace it. See MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING
CIVIL PROCEDURE 28–32 (2017).
23
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
24
Id. at 297–98.
25
Id. at 292.
26
Id. (listing (1) burden on the defendant, (2) forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3)
plaintiff’s interest in convenient relief, (4) efficiency of resolution, and (5) shared state interests).
27
471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985).
28
See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
20
21
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Nicastro. 29 There, although the fairness factors cried out for litigation in New
Jersey, 30 the plurality found no relevant contact and, therefore, no jurisdiction. 31
Now enters the Court’s restriction of general jurisdiction. Prior to 2011,
courts exercised general jurisdiction if the defendant had “continuous and
systematic” contacts with the forum. 32 In cases decided in 2011, 2014, and 2017,
the Court abruptly limited general jurisdiction to where a defendant could be
considered “at home.” 33 For a corporate defendant, this concept evidently is
restricted to at most two states: its state of incorporation and the state of its
principal place of business. 34 The Court has failed to explain why this restriction,
which is significant, was necessary.
And now we see the new generation of specific jurisdiction cases. In BMS
and Ford, the defendant had continuous, ongoing, and substantial purposeful
contacts with the forum. The question became whether the plaintiff’s claim was
sufficiently related to the contacts to justify specific jurisdiction. In other words,
the two-step inquiry of World-Wide Volkswagen became a three-step
assessment: (1) purposeful contacts, (2) relatedness of the claim to the contacts,
and, presumably, (3) whether jurisdiction was fair or reasonable. 35
In BMS, 678 plaintiffs filed suit in a California state court against
pharmaceutical giant Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), 36 seeking damages for
personal injuries allegedly caused by BMS’s drug Plavix (a blood thinner).
BMS’s contacts with California were extensive but could no longer support
general jurisdiction. 37 The jurisdictional difficulty was that 592 of the plaintiffs
564 U.S. 873, 882–84 (2011).
See id. at 886–87. The plaintiff resided in the forum, the plaintiff was injured in the forum by a machine
purchased by his employer, the forum had an interest in providing a remedy and regulating workplace safety,
the witnesses to the injury and the machine were in the forum, and forum law governed the plaintiff’s tort claim.
Id.
31
Id. at 886.
32
International Shoe Co. v. Washington did not employ that phrase, but clearly embraced the notion of
general jurisdiction. 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).
33
The three cases working this transformation were BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1555
(2017), Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014), and Goodyear, Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Many have criticized the Court’s still-unexplained restriction of general
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2012); see also infra note 160.
34
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784, 1789 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 1781–83 (2017) (majority opinion).
36
Id. at 1778.
37
Id. at 1778, 1780.
29
30
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were not residents of California. The Plavix they ingested was not manufactured,
packaged, labeled, or sold in California. 38 Those 592 plaintiffs could not connect
their claims to BMS’s California contacts. 39 They did not get Plavix through
California doctors; they did not ingest Plavix in California; and they were neither
injured nor treated in California. 40 On the other hand, the California court had
specific jurisdiction over BMS for the claims by the eighty-six plaintiffs who
were residents of California. 41 The jurisdictional “relatedness” issue was a
difficulty only for the non-California plaintiffs.
The relatedness requirement, now front and center, required the Court to
wrestle with a standard phrase in specific jurisdiction cases: the plaintiff’s claim
must “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum activities. 42 Long ago, in
his dissent in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 43 Justice
Brennan argued that the phrase should be split, with “arise out of” meaning
something different from “relate to.” 44 Specifically, he argued, “relate to” is
broader than “arise out of.” 45 In the Brennan view, if a defendant has massive
contacts with the forum, specific jurisdiction could be upheld based upon a lesser
showing of relatedness than if the defendant had limited contacts with the
forum. 46 In BMS, however, the Court rejected both the effort to parse the phrase
(“arise out of or related to”) and the effort to engage a sliding scale, which the
California Supreme Court used to assert jurisdiction over all the claims. 47
Bluntly, said the majority, there is no sliding scale and the plaintiffs’ claims
neither “arose from or related to” the defendant’s contacts. 48 On the facts, the
non-Californians’ claims simply did not relate sufficiently to BMS’s California
contacts to justify jurisdiction. 49

Id. at 1778.
Id. at 1781.
40
Id. at 1778.
41
Id.
42
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The actual phrase used in International Shoe
is “arise out of or are connected with,” but over the years the Court’s “most common formulation of the rule”
uses the phrase “arise out of or relate to” the suit. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017,
1026 (2021).
43
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
44
Id. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 426. Justice Brennan made this argument in asserting that Texas had specific jurisdiction in
Helicopteros. Id. The majority of the Court in that case did not address the issue, however, because it interpreted
the plaintiffs’ inartful brief to concede that there was no specific jurisdiction. Id. at 415 (majority opinion).
47
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
48
Id.
49
Id.
38
39
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BMS provided little guidance. The Court did nothing to resolve a split of
approaches to relatedness that had evolved in state and lower federal courts. 50
For instance, must the defendant’s contact with the forum include the very
product (such as the particular pill) that harmed the plaintiff? Must there be a
causal relationship between contact and claim? If so, must it be one of proximate
cause, but-for cause, or some other form of causation? These and other open
questions required the Court to return to the field, which it did in Ford.
Our focus is Ford, which involved two consolidated cases. 51
II. FORD: THE MAJORITY OPINION AND THE POTENTIAL SLIDING SCALE
APPROACH
The consolidated cases in Ford involved similar facts. 52 For convenience,
the Court principally discussed the Minnesota case. There, a Crown Victoria
manufactured by Ford Motor Company outside Minnesota and marketed into
North Dakota was involved in a rear-end collision with a snowplow. 53 The
passenger-side airbag did not deploy, which resulted in serious injury to the
passenger, who sued Ford in Minnesota. 54 Ford conceded its purposeful contact
with Minnesota. 55 Indeed, its contact was massive and included dealerships,
advertising, vehicle sales, and the provision of parts and service. 56 Likewise,
Ford did not argue that jurisdiction in Minnesota would be unfair. Rather, Ford’s
entire argument was that its contacts with the forum were not sufficiently related
to the suit—specifically, that it neither manufactured nor marketed the specific
Crown Victoria in Minnesota. 57
Ford took a markedly different approach to relatedness than BMS. Following
Justice Brennan’s suggestion in Helicopteros, the majority bifurcated the “arise
out of or relate to” phrase and, in so doing, inevitably rekindled discussion of a
sliding-scale analysis, 58 although it probably will not be called that after the term

See infra note 130.
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2021).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1023.
54
Id. The companion case was from Montana and involved a wreck in that state of a Ford Explorer
originally sold by Ford in Washington. Id. The Montana wreck resulted in the death of the plaintiff’s decedent
who, like plaintiff, was a resident of Montana. Id.
55
Id. at 1026.
56
Id. at 1028.
57
See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)
(Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5332, at *4.
58
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
50
51
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was pilloried in BMS. 59 In the Minnesota case involved in Ford, the Court noted
the defendant’s considerable contacts with the forum: it maintained eighty-four
independent dealerships in the state, which sold new Fords and offered service
and parts for new and used vehicles; it advertised through multiple media in the
state; it sold thousands of new vehicles there, including the same year and model
that was involved in the plaintiff’s wreck; and it provided parts to stores
throughout the state. 60
Ford’s contacts with Minnesota were so “continuous and systematic” that
pre-2011 it surely would not have contested jurisdiction. In fact, from 1945
(when International Shoe was decided) until 2011, Ford did not make a single
constitutional challenge to personal jurisdiction in a single American case with
similar facts. 61 But now, after the Court’s contraction of general jurisdiction, the
case had to sink or swim on specific jurisdiction.
And here, although the plaintiff was a Minnesota resident injured on a
Minnesota road, 62 the car in question did not get into Minnesota through Ford’s
actions. Ford did not design or manufacture the car in Minnesota. 63 It did not
sell the car in Minnesota (Ford sold the car to a dealership in North Dakota,
where it was purchased by its first owner). 64 The car made its way to Minnesota
through a series of private second- and third-hand sales, eventually being owned
by the Minnesota resident who drove it when the crash occurred. 65
Ford did not (and could not) argue it lacked purposeful contacts with
Minnesota in light of the dealerships and sales. 66 Similarly, Ford did not (and

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1782 (2017).
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028.
61
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Roberts Court’s Jurisdictional Revolution within Ford’s Frame, 51
STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors) (noting a Westlaw search shows
that Ford made no such challenge in any domestic case during those years).
62
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1023.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)
(Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5332, at *12. The basic facts, as noted, were the same in
the companion Montana case. There, a Montana resident was killed in the crash of a 1996 Ford Explorer. Ford,
141 S. Ct. at 1023. Ford engaged in the same activities in Montana as in Minnesota, with the exception that it
maintained thirty-six dealerships. Id. at 1028. The wreck occurred on a Montana highway and, although Ford
sold the same model in Montana, the car involved was manufactured in Canada and initially sold in Washington.
Id. at 1023. It got to Montana through a series of private transactions. Id. at 1028.
66
Id. One interesting argument might have been whether the automobile involved in the case constituted
the requisite contact between Ford and Minnesota. The argument would have had to contend with the holding in
World-Wide Volkswagen that the car’s getting into the forum through the unilateral act of the plaintiff does not
constitute a contact.
59
60
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could not) argue that the exercise of jurisdiction in Minnesota would be unfair.
Its entire argument was based upon relatedness: the plaintiff’s claim did not—
according to Ford—”arise out of or relate to” Ford’s contacts with the forum. 67
It argued that the relatedness requirement can be satisfied only by a “causal”
relationship—specifically, that the very car in which the plaintiff was injured
was (1) designed, (2) manufactured, or (3) sold directly by Ford in the forum. 68
The Court unanimously rejected this argument and upheld specific
jurisdiction. 69 The majority opinion by Justice Kagan did exactly what the
majority in BMS refused to do: it adopted Justice Brennan’s approach that the
phrase “arise out of” be separated from the phrase “relate to.” 70 The former, the
majority concluded, requires causation: that the defendant’s contact with the
forum caused the harm suffered by the plaintiff. 71 But—and this is a crucial
point—a causal relationship is not required for all cases. 72 In some cases, all that
is required is that the defendant’s contact with the forum “relate to”—i.e., have
some factual connection with—the plaintiff’s claim. 73
How does a court decide which test (“arise out of” or “related to”) to use?
Here, the Court also appeared to do what it refused to do in BMS: recognize
(although not in so many words) a sliding scale. If the defendant has a great deal
of contact with the forum, such as Ford’s contacts with Minnesota, the plaintiff
need only satisfy the “relate to” test to support specific jurisdiction. On the other
hand, if the defendant has relatively less contact with the forum, the plaintiff
perhaps must show a causal relationship between the defendant’s contact and
her claim. But the Court failed to explain how much of a causal relationship is
required for a claim to “arise out of” forum contacts: but-for causation?
Proximate causation? Some other type of causation? Maybe as one slides up the
67
See Brief for Petitioner at 1, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)
(Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5332, at *4.
68
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1023.
69
Id. at 1022. The majority emphasized that its holding was presaged by its discussion, in dictum, about
jurisdiction over the manufacturer of the vehicle involved in World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at 1027 (citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 297 (1980)). There, in rejecting jurisdiction over two
New York defendants for lack of contact with Oklahoma, the Court said that the forum certainly had personal
jurisdiction over the German manufacturer. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 297). The
Court failed to notice one distinction between the cases: in World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiff was not a
resident of the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. The Court’s statement in Ford makes clear that
this difference will not affect jurisdiction. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1027–28. Moreover, in Daimler, the Court said,
“[W]e used the Audi/Volkswagen scenario as a paradigm case of specific jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 124 (2014)).
70
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026; see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
71
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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scale to more substantial contacts, a weaker form of causation is needed—such
as pure “but-for” causation—but on more isolated contacts, a stronger form of
causation, such as proximate causation (with the requirements of foreseeability
and directness it entails 74), is required. Once one reaches the volume of contacts
that once supported general jurisdiction, a non-causal relationship suffices. But
only the latter proposition is free from doubt; the Court dropped only hints as to
how to resolve cases with fewer contacts.
An early Supreme Court case that stands at the opposite end of the
relatedness scale is McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 75 As far as the
McGee record showed, the defendant Texas life insurance company had only
one insured in the forum state of California. 76 The insured died, but the Texas
company refused to pay the insured’s mother (the beneficiary), claiming that the
death was a suicide and thus not covered. 77 The mother sued in California. 78 The
Supreme Court held that the Texas company had minimum contacts with
California. 79 As scant as the defendant’s contacts were with California, it is hard
to imagine a tighter relationship between the contacts and the claim. The Texas
company accepted the benefits (premiums) of having an insured in California,
and the claim was on that policy. 80 It is an entirely foreseeable consequence of
doing business with a Californian that a dispute with that Californian will arise
from those dealings. So, while the quantity of the contacts could hardly have
been smaller in McGee, the quality of them could hardly have been greater. In
Ford, the quantity of the contacts meant that a looser relationship sufficed; in
McGee, the direct causal relationship between the contacts and the claim meant
that a tiny volume of contacts sufficed.
One should not assume that Ford overruled BMS sub silentio. The
defendant’s contacts with California in BMS were vastly greater than the Texas
company’s contacts in McGee. But—as to the non-California plaintiffs—the
relationship between the defendant’s California contacts and their claims was
attenuated. They probably saw identical television ads, took the same drug, and
suffered similar injuries, but not in California. 81 Unlike Ford, in which the
market for used Ford vehicles surely depended on the availability of service,
74
See Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives on Skepticism, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 102 n.147 (2012).
75
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
76
Id. at 222.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 221.
79
Id. at 223.
80
Id.
81
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
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replacement parts, and so on in the forum state, 82 nothing about BMS’s presence
in California could have induced a New Jersey plaintiff to take Plavix.
Perhaps, from the standpoint of efficiency, state courts could develop
something akin to the federal statute consolidating large numbers of related
cases for pretrial matters as federal courts do in multi-district litigation. 83 Indeed,
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent urged that the efficiencies of a single nationwide
class action for the Plavix claims justified jurisdiction in California because the
defendant conceded that the California and non-California claims were
identical. 84 This relationship between the cases should be sufficient, she
argued. 85 But the rest of the Court disagreed, 86 and nothing in Ford suggests
they have changed their mind.
More broadly, distinguishing between contacts that “arise out of” and “relate
to” the cause of action seems to engage an assessment like the old “continuous
and systematic” test for general jurisdiction. The Ford majority opinion reads
like the “old era” (pre-2011) general jurisdiction cases: the Court noted Ford’s
“substantial business in the State,” 87 that Ford “systematically served” the state
market, 88 that it “regularly conduct[ed]” business in the state, 89 and, in
discussing World-Wide Volkswagen, the defendant’s “systematic contacts” with
the forum. 90 Of course, here such extensive ties with the forum no longer support
general jurisdiction. But they do permit specific jurisdiction over the defendant
for a claim that merely “relates to” those ties. The Court cautions that the “relates
to” test does not mean “anything goes” but, instead, imposes “real limits” to
protect the defendant from litigation in an inappropriate place. 91 But what are
those limits?

See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021).
28 U.S.C. § 1407.
84
BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 1786–87, 1789. In view of the “interstate judicial system’s shared interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1984),
Justice Sotomayor had a good point. Cf. Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
CHI. L. F. 119, 138 (2001) (arguing that the personal jurisdiction doctrine might facilitate litigation in a single
forum of all claims arising from a single transaction or occurrence).
86
BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84.
87
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022.
88
Id. at 1028.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1029. Similarly, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion referred to Ford’s “heavy presence” in
Minnesota. Id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority contrasted such continuous ties with
“isolated or sporadic” contacts. Id. at 1028 n.4 (majority opinion).
91
Id. at 1026.
82
83
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On the facts of the case, Ford was easy. Ford’s extensive activities in
Minnesota were aimed at creating a market for Ford vehicles in that state. By
advertising, providing parts, and maintaining dealerships that repair used
vehicles, the company encouraged Minnesotans to become Ford owners, even if
they bought their car out of state in a second-hand transaction. 92 Ford cultivated
relationships with Minnesota residents. The Court was willing to assume that the
plaintiffs “might never have bought” the used car “except for Ford’s contacts
with their home States.” 93 The plaintiff’s claim “relate[d] to” these contacts even
though the very car in which the plaintiff was injured got into the forum through
the acts of third parties. But that tells us little about the needed relationship if
the contacts are less voluminous.
III. THE ALITO CONCURRENCE
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment in Ford. 94 Although he “agree[d]
with the main thrust of the Court’s opinion,” 95 and emphasized the same “heavy
presence” of Ford in Montana and Minnesota, 96 he wrote separately to criticize
this “new gloss . . . on our case law.” 97 He complained that by splitting “arise
out of” from “relate to,” the majority had recognized “a new category” of
specific jurisdiction cases, in which plaintiffs’ claims “are not caused by” the
defendant’s forum contacts “but nevertheless sufficiently ‘relate to’ those
contacts in some undefined way . . . .” 98 Such a broad concept, he asserted, on
the one hand, risks “needless complications,” since the majority had given no
indication of what the limits on “relate to” would be.99 On the other hand, the
entire phrase appropriately limits the scope of specific jurisdiction by requiring
some sort of “causal link” between the forum contacts and the claim, just not the
strict “but for” causation test that Ford had urged. 100

See id. at 1022–23.
Id. at 1029.
94
Id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
95
Id. at 1033.
96
Id. at 1032.
97
Id. at 1033.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1033–34.
100
Id. at 1033. In this case, the causal link was present. It was reasonable to infer that without Ford’s
activities in the forum state, “the vehicles in question here would never have been on the roads in Minnesota and
Montana . . . [because] [t]he whole point of those activities was to put more Fords (including those in question
here) on Minnesota and Montana roads.” Id. This “common-sense relationship between Ford’s activities and
these suits . . . is causal in the broad sense of the concept” and was sufficient “without strict proof of the type
Ford would require.” Id.
92
93
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Justice Alito correctly foresaw that the majority’s approach, and especially
its de facto adoption of the sliding scale approach, which had been rejected in
his opinion for the Court in BMS, 101 could enable the Court to expand the scope
of specific jurisdiction far beyond that currently permitted by World-Wide
Volkswagen and its progeny. 102 At the same time, however, he noted that the
current law of personal jurisdiction may not be “well suited for the way in which
business is now conducted.” 103 This observation perhaps explains why he
concurred rather than dissented. For, as he asked, how could “anyone seriously
argue that requiring Ford to litigate these cases in Minnesota and Montana would
be fundamentally unfair?” 104
Indeed, how could they? 105 But despite Justice Alito’s contention that the
case could be decided correctly “without any alteration or refinement of our case
law,” 106 this is simply not so. Ford’s strict causation argument was not
foreclosed by the Court’s prior cases. 107 Justice Alito’s causation requirement is
just as much a “refinement” of the case law as the majority’s splitting of the
“arise out of or relate to” phrase and its use of a de facto sliding scale.
Apparently, Justice Alito would prefer to expand the scope of specific
jurisdiction to cover cases like Ford in a less expansive way than would the
majority, or at least in a way that does not reject so much of his handiwork in
BMS. 108
IV. THE GORSUCH CONCURRENCE
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, also concurred in the

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
See Ford, 141 U.S. at 1033–34 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
103
Id. at 1332.
104
Id.
105
As Arthur’s wife (who is not a lawyer) said when he stated the case to her, any other result would be
“stupid.” Justice Alito apparently agrees. Borchers gave a mid-term exam to his first-year students in the Fall of
2020 using the facts of the Minnesota Ford case and almost all his students concluded that Ford was subject to
jurisdiction. However, the fact that some of them concluded otherwise, and that there were two dissenting
justices in the Minnesota Supreme Court (although none in the Montana case) perhaps shows that reading too
many minimum-contacts cases can rob you of your common sense. See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931
N.W.2d 744, 755 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting); Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 443
P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019).
106
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
107
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
108
He may be particularly solicitous of BMS’s strong rejection of a sliding scale: “Our cases provide no
support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.” BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1781 (2017) (emphasis added). As we have explained, Ford now provides support for
this approach. See supra Part II.
101
102
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judgment. 109 The opinion is divided into two parts. The first is a critique of the
majority’s minimum-contacts analysis. 110 The second—and more radical—is an
invitation to reconsider International Shoe and the link between the Due Process
Clause and personal jurisdiction based on the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 111
A. The Critique of the Majority Opinion
Like Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch criticized the majority’s parsing of the
“arise out of or relate to” phrase. 112 As he noted, construing a causal linkage
between the defendant’s forum-state activities and the operative events of the
suit in purely “but for” terms is a trivial check on the meaning of “relate to.” 113
He thought the phrase best read as a “unit,” 114 although he did not explicitly
offer an alternative reading. The majority variously described Ford’s activities
as having a “relationship,” “affiliation,” or “connection” with the forum state. 115
However, Justice Gorsuch complained that this leaves the second step of specific
jurisdiction—the needed relationship of the defendant’s forum-state contacts to
the cause of action—”far from clear.” 116
The majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence both bucked
against the radical limitation of general jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler to
corporate defendants’ “homes.” 117 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence asked a
reasonable question: what sense does it make to limit a multinational corporation
with multiple headquarters to two homes—its principal place of business
(defined apparently by the “nerve center” test that applies to the federal venue
statute) 118 and its state of incorporation? 119
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1034–36.
111
See id. at 1036–39.
112
Id.
113
Id.; see also Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that receipt by
plaintiffs in forum state of advertisement for cruise was a related contact because injury would not have occurred
but for the forum-state act), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 485 (1991).
114
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1034.
117
Id. at 1024–25 (majority opinion); id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
118
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
119
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036–38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Gorsuch attempted to
lean on footnote dictum that corporations might have another home besides these two. See id. at 1034 (citing
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017)). But if these extra homes exist, they are extremely hard
to find. See BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560–61 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part). Perhaps a more apt analogy would
be the multiple “abodes” an individual can have for abode service of process. See, e.g., Nat’l Dev. Co. v. Triad
Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1991).
109
110
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Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence discussed extensively the majority’s “duck
decoy” hypothetical. 120 The majority argued, and Justice Gorsuch agreed, that a
sole proprietor in Maine selling an occasional home-made duck decoy over the
internet to an out-of-state buyer is much differently positioned from Ford with
its dealerships, advertising, and the resources to hire lawyers in any state. 121 But
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence professed confusion as to how, under the
majority’s test, the duck decoy creator could be distinguished in a principled
fashion from Ford. 122
However, one cannot always neatly separate the quantity and quality of the
defendant’s contacts. A large volume of commercial activity connotes a
purposeful effort to connect with, and a deeper relationship to, the forum state.
Ford sold many Crown Victoria and Explorer models in the forum states because
it is a vastly larger enterprise and invests infinitely more marketing resources
than a hobbyist with an Etsy store. Ford advertises, has dealerships, services
cars, holds promotions, and sells repair parts in every state. 123 Moreover, the
resale market exists in part due to the availability of service and repair parts for
Ford vehicles. 124 If the duck decoy crafter sold one to a Nebraskan, who then resold it to a Coloradan friend who dropped it and the decoy splintered and injured
the eye of the Coloradan end-purchaser, it is easy to distinguish that case from
Ford. The duck decoy seller does not have related contacts because his
connection to Colorado is trivial, even if he also sold a few other decoys directly
to Coloradans. The decoy maker is not promising to provide services or do
anything else that serves the Colorado resale market; there is no meaningful
relationship between his Etsy store and the Coloradan’s eye injury.
Both the majority and Justice Gorsuch seemingly would like to ditch
(quietly) the “essentially at home” test for general jurisdiction. 125 The difference
between their two approaches is which exit door each would choose. The
majority—as discussed above 126—appeared to adopt a sliding scale; the greater
the volume of contacts, the more likely they are related to the claim. But the
majority could not use that term after it was pilloried in the last Supreme Court
120
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1035, 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Duck decoys are man-made
models of ducks, floated in the water by duck hunters to fool live ducks into thinking that it is a safe water. See
Duck Decoy (Model), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duck_decoy_(model) (Dec. 28, 2020, 6:37 PM).
121
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 n.4 (majority opinion); id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
122
Id. at 1035 (“[B]etween the poles of ‘continuous’ and ‘isolated’ contacts lie a virtually infinite number
of ‘affiliations’ waiting to be explored.”).
123
Id. at 1022–23 (majority opinion).
124
Id. at 1028.
125
See id. at 1026; id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
126
See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
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minimum-contacts case. 127 Justice Gorsuch would like to slip out by finding
more “homes” for large corporations. 128 Justice Gorsuch complained that the
majority’s relationship test lacks clarity, 129 but the pre-Goodyear tests for
“continuous and systematic” contacts, which a search for additional corporate
homes would likely resemble, were also unclear. 130
Few would describe the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
as Justice Holmes’s “seamless web.” 131 But one can give all three Ford opinions
credit for this much: they recognized the issue as mostly one of fairness. 132 Ford
could not plausibly claim that it would have been fairer to litigate the cases in
the states where Ford initially sold the vehicles. The witnesses, the physical
evidence, a view of the accident scene, the residence of the injured parties and
co-defendants, and everything else necessary for a fair trial pointed to the injury
states. 133 Ford’s obvious motive was to impede the plaintiffs’ prosecution of the
case and perhaps avoid liability if the limitations period had run in other forums
and if no savings statute applied. 134
B. International Shoe’s Vitality
The second portion of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence questioned the utility
of the general/specific jurisdiction dichotomy implicit in International
Shoe 135—and the core of International Shoe itself—and remarked that “it’s hard
not to ask how we got here and where we might be headed.” 136 This might
prompt eye-rolling as if Justice Gorsuch would take us back to the horse-andbuggy era, but in fact he was arguing for broader corporate jurisdiction. His
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]t seems almost quaint [to assign
only two homes] in 2021 when corporations with global reach often have massive operations spread across
multiple States.”).
129
Id. at 1034–35.
130
See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & CHRIS A. WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 382–84 (6th ed. 2018).
131
See James L. Huffman, From Legal History to Legal Theory: Or Is It the Other Way Around?, 40
TULSA L. REV. 579, 579–80 n.3 (2005) (noting that the quotation is usually attributed to Justice Holmes, but that
English lawyer and legal historian Frederic Maitland may have been the first to use it in a legal context).
132
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1029–30; id. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
133
Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (noting private factors in forum non conveniens
dismissals).
134
E.g., IOWA CODE § 614.10 (2021) (giving plaintiff six months to refile an action dismissed on nonmerits grounds).
135
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945); see also Arthur T. von Mehren &
Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136, 1144,
1147 (1966), cited in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984)).
136
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
127
128
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opinion, for a few paragraphs, reviewed the Court’s jurisprudence leading to
International Shoe. 137 As he noted, state courts in the Pennoyer-toInternational-Shoe era treated corporations doing business in the forum state as
“present” and thus amenable to service. 138 Justice Gorsuch cited, 139 with
seeming approval, the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of
Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 140 which held that states could
require out-of-state corporations to appoint an agent for service of process, and
thus render the corporation amenable to general jurisdiction. 141 But, as Justice
Gorsuch noted, in a series of Supreme Court “muscular interventions,” 142
corporations found “a more receptive audience” in a Court that shielded them
from jurisdiction in states where they conducted significant commerce. 143
Although he did not get one, Justice Black—who wrote separately in
International Shoe 144—deserved a hat tip from Justice Gorsuch. Justice Black
saw as frivolous the International Shoe Company’s due-process argument for
avoiding suit where it sold a significant quantity of shoes. 145 Justice Black, ever
the constitutional literalist, argued that “it is unthinkable that the vague due
process clause was ever intended to prohibit a State from regulating or taxing a
business carried on within its boundaries simply because this is done by agents
of a corporation organized and having its headquarters elsewhere.” 146 His
opinion concluded, “I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State,
without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts,’ a power to . . . open the doors of its courts for its
citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those States.” 147
Essentially, this was Justice Gorsuch’s argument. Unmoored from
constitutional language, jurisdictional law has given corporations doing business
on an interstate 148 or international 149 scale solicitous treatment as defendants.
Justice Gorsuch mused: “Nearly 80 years removed from International Shoe, it
seems corporations continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the
Id. at 1036–37.
Id. at 1037 (citing Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 22 So. 53, 55–56 (Miss. 1897)).
139
Id.
140
243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917).
141
Id. at 96.
142
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
143
Id. at 1036–37 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517–18 (1923)).
144
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (opinion of Black, J.).
145
Id. at 323.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 324–25.
148
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
149
See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 894 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987).
137
138
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name of the Constitution. Less clear is why.” 150 Justice Black called it. Left
floating free of the rest of due process jurisprudence, the minimum-contacts test
became a doctrinal orphan, allowing considerations alien to the Due Process
Clause—such as “state sovereignty” 151 and “interstate federalism” 152—to
significantly determine the state-court forums available to private litigants. 153
And then there is the possibility that the conventional notion that Pennoyer
v. Neff 154 constitutionalized the limits of state-court territorial reach is a “giant
misunderstanding.” 155 The Supreme Court routinely asserted, without judicial
question until Ford, that Pennoyer established direct due-process limits on
personal jurisdiction; if a state reaches too far it violates due process. 156
However, extensive historical analyses (one of which Justice Gorsuch’s opinion
cited) show that the question of whether Pennoyer established the Due Process
Clause as the source of jurisdictional limitations is debatable. 157 As Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion put it, these analyses “at least seek to answer the right
question” 158—that is, what do the Constitution’s text, structure, and history
require?

150
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in the judgment).
151
J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884.
152
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
153
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Muddy-Booted, Disingenuous Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA.
L. REV. F. 21, 24 (2018); Harold Lewis, The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction
in Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 699 (1983).
154
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
155
See Borchers, supra note 153, at 22.
156
See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (“It has long
been established that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”); Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (“In [Pennoyer], decided shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons reaches no farther than the geographic
bounds of the forum.”).
157
See Steven Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2017), cited in Ford Motor Co.
v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1036 n.7 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that Pennoyer invoked the Due Process Clause only as a mechanism to enforce the general common
law of jurisdiction, not to set rules of jurisdiction); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional
Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 24, 40
(1990) (arguing that Pennoyer may have invoked the Due Process Clause only to ensure that defendants were
able to challenge jurisdiction under state law and that the Supreme Court should largely abandon its efforts to
regulate state-court jurisdiction); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 499–500 (1987) (referring to Pennoyer’s
reliance on the Due Process clause as “startling”); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on StateCourt Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 501 (1981) (providing an exhaustive review of due-process
and full-faith-and-credit law and arguing that Pennoyer was erroneously decided).
158
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036 n.7 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Clearly this is an invitation for scholarly inquiry into the relationship
between the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and limits on
personal jurisdiction. We will not attempt in this brief article to engage this
project in depth. Some state courts, in the immediate aftermath of Pennoyer, did
not view the Due Process Clause as a restraint on their jurisdiction. 159 If the
Supreme Court engages in a fundamental reconsideration of the constitutional
bases for limiting state-court jurisdiction, matters could change considerably.
Congress and state legislatures might gain considerably more latitude in defining
the boundaries of personal jurisdiction. But for now, the minimum-contacts test
retains its status as the fundamental test of personal jurisdiction.
V. WHAT NOW?
Before engaging in a catalogue of questions left unanswered by the Ford
opinion, we note that the Supreme Court got it right in Ford. We and other
commentators have had plenty to say about cases in which we think the Supreme
Court reached a dubious result, 160 and other cases in which the Supreme Court
got the result right but took away forum choices that we think should be available
to plaintiffs. 161 So, reaching an inarguably fair and just result for essentially the
right reasons deserves a round of applause.
A. Ford Frustration
That said, Ford is frustrating on several levels. First, the bifurcation of “arise
out of” and “relate to” is significant, but the Court fails to tell us how the
assessment is made. 162 At what point are contacts sufficient to invoke the
“relates to” test? Second, if the “arise out of” test is applied, and causation
between the defendant’s activity and the plaintiff’s claim is assessed, how is it
to be judged? Is it but-for causation? Proximate causation? Some other type of
causation?

159
See, e.g., Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137 (1881) (holding that jurisdiction over a
corporation was allowed based on in-state service of its president, but with no other connection to the forum
state).
160
See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for: Goodyear, Daimler,
and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2002 (2014); Patrick J. Borchers, J.
McIntyre, Goodyear and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245–46
(2011); Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161, 1164
(2015).
161
See, e.g., Freer, supra note 160; Hoffheimer, supra note 33, at 551–52.
162
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
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Most frustrating, perhaps, is the majority’s lack of attention to methodology.
BMS strongly implied that specific jurisdiction consists of three steps: (1)
purposeful contact, (2) relatedness, and (3) an assessment of the fairness
factors. 163 It is clear from Ford that the starting point is a concession of
purposeful contact (which is obvious on the facts). 164 The majority opinion
defines relevant contacts as requiring “purposeful availment” 165 but does not
mention foreseeability, which had been established as relevant in World-Wide
Volkswagen. 166 Still, the concept seems implicit in the Ford conclusion that
Ford’s level of contact in the forum gave it “fair warning” that it might be
subjected to jurisdiction there. 167
Less clear is how one assesses the fairness of specific jurisdiction. The Court
long ago (in World-Wide Volkswagen) laid out five fairness factors, 168 and even
Justice Ginsburg came to embrace the consideration of fairness as a separate
check on jurisdiction, in specific jurisdiction cases, from that of minimum
contacts. 169 In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 170 those
fairness factors were enough to defeat jurisdiction even though four (maybe five)
Justices thought that the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum
state. 171 In Ford, the majority never addressed the reasonableness of jurisdiction
(the fairness factors) expressly. 172 Still, the fairness considerations are present,
but in Ford they were mixed in with relatedness. 173 For instance, concern with
burden on the defendant is addressed by the Court’s conclusion that there is
nothing unfair in making Ford defend where it does such substantial business
(and reaps such substantial rewards). 174 And the forum state’s interest is present
in the Court’s embrace of “interstate federalism.” 175 Minnesota has an interest,
the Court insists, that other states not intrude on its ability to provide a remedy
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–83 (2017).
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024–25.
165
Id.
166
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
167
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025. This conclusion is consistent with the World-Wide Volkswagen requirement
of foreseeability that the defendant might be sued in the particular forum.
168
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
169
Justice Ginsburg did so in dictum in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014).
170
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
171
Id. at 113–16 (plurality opinion); id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that, although it
was unnecessary to the result, he would be “inclined” to find purposeful availment based on volume of sales in
the forum state).
172
See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022–32.
173
See id. at 1026–30.
174
See id. at 1026, 1030.
175
See id. at 1030.
163
164
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for its residents. 176 It also has an interest in enforcing its motor vehicle safety
laws. 177 The plaintiff’s interest in suing at home is clearly facilitated by
upholding jurisdiction. Finally, the interest in efficient litigation is fostered by
suit in Minnesota because the witnesses and relevant evidence will likely be
there and (although the Court does not mention this) the forum state’s law will
govern on the merits. 178
If the fairness factors are still a separate element of specific jurisdiction, the
Court should say so. In Asahi, they defeated jurisdiction. 179 In Burger King, the
Court suggested they might bolster the argument for jurisdiction in a case of
marginal contacts. 180 If the fairness factors are subsumed under the relatedness
inquiry, the Court should be explicit so that lower courts and lawyers can
appropriately analyze and brief the issues.
B. “Vacation Cases”
Perhaps the most common sort of cases presenting close questions of
relatedness are what we call “vacation cases.” Frequently, a plaintiff decides to
vacation out of state (at a hotel, at a resort, or on a cruise ship), gets injured there,
and returns and wishes to sue in her home state. 181 Can she get jurisdiction back
home? Pre-2011, if it were a national enterprise, the answer was yes—on general
jurisdiction grounds. But not now.
We could choose from scores of cases in this basic fact pattern, but a wellknown Texas Supreme Court decision suits our purposes. Moki Mac River
Expeditions v. Drugg 182 is a sad story. The plaintiffs’ decedent (a thirteen-yearold boy) died in Utah on a river-rafting excursion. 183 The Texas-domiciled
plaintiffs learned of the outdoor adventure through a friend. 184 There was no
room for the boy on rafting adventures that year, but he was put on a waiting

176

Id.
Id.
178
Not only that, but the plaintiff’s suit against the driver of the vehicle (who was a Minnesota resident)
would proceed in that state. Forcing the plaintiff to sue Ford in a different state would be wildly inefficient
because it would require two suits, one against Ford in North Dakota and one against the driver in Minnesota.
179
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987) (plurality opinion); id. at
116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
180
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
181
See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
498 U.S. 485 (1991).
182
221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007).
183
Id. at 573.
184
Id.
177
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list. 185 A place opened up the next year, and the plaintiffs paid for the boy to
enroll in a fourteen-day trip. 186
The decedent’s mother corresponded by e-mail with the Utah-based
defendant-outfitter from her home in Texas. 187 She decided to send her son on
the trip based on its representation that “[y]ou don’t need ‘mountain man’
camping skills to participate in one of our trips, children age twelve or above are
suited to participate, and [the defendant] has taken reasonable steps to provide
you with appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides.” 188 She alleged that but
for those representations, she would not have sent her son on the excursion. 189
Tragically, her son was killed on the second day of the excursion; a boulder
blocked the group’s hiking path, the defendant’s guides failed to provide
adequate guidance on how to get around the boulder safely, and her son fell to
his death. 190
The plaintiffs sued in Texas on a variety of theories, including negligent
misrepresentation in the defendant’s materials, along with negligence of their
employees in supervising the excursion. 191 The Texas Supreme Court,
flummoxed by the array of tests used by other courts, invented one of its own.
Courts on one side take the position that a bare causal relationship between the
defendant’s forum state contacts suffices; 192 others take the position that all the
liability-creating events need to take place in the forum state. 193 The Texas court
attempted to hit a middle ground with a test that it called “substantial connection
to operative facts.” 194 Applying this test, the Texas Supreme Court held that
specific jurisdiction was lacking. 195
But what would be the result with Ford on the books? Events of significance
occurred in the forum state of Texas. The mother alleged that she was induced
to send her young son on the trip because it was represented to be safe for
children twelve or older. The defendant obviously knew it was dealing with a
185

Id.
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 585 (internal quotations omitted).
189
Id.
190
Id. at 573.
191
Id.
192
See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
498 U.S. 485 (1991).
193
See Tecre Co. v. Buttonpro, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (citing Marino v. Hyatt
Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1986)) (applying the substantive relevance test).
194
Moki Mac, 221 S.W.2d at 584.
195
Id. at 588.
186
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Texas customer. True, the guides who allegedly failed to take reasonable safety
precautions are likely in Utah—although if it were a summer job, they may have
headed back to their home states. Physical evidence of the condition of the trail
would be in Utah, assuming (maybe but not assuredly) that it is in the same
condition as it was at the time of the fatal fall.
One can argue as to whether Texas or Utah is a better forum. But to us, this
seems like an “angels on the head of a pin” debate. Evidence and witnesses are
spread across at least two states. Under Ford, a defendant—in a specific
jurisdiction case—does not have an absolute constitutional right to draw the
plaintiff to the defendant’s home state. 196 Perhaps sub-constitutional devices
such as forum non conveniens could reroute the case to where the most physical
evidence is located. 197 One of Ford’s major virtues is to end the exclusive focus
on the inconvenience to the defendant and bring both parties into the calculus.
But even if there is (as we think there should be) jurisdiction on the Moki
Mac facts, slight variations in the facts make it a stronger or weaker case for
jurisdiction. For example, suppose that the defendant also had guided tours in
Texas. Although this case is not as strong as Ford, the relationship between its
Texas and Utah activities becomes more obvious. On the other hand, suppose
the mother in Moki Mac had simply heard about the tour from a friend, never
read any of the allegedly misleading literature, and simply filled out a form with
preferred dates and mailed a check to Utah. Now all we have is pure but-for
causation, which Justice Gorsuch pointed out is not much of a limitation. 198 In
these very common fact patterns, we still do not have clear guidance.
C. Plaintiffs Injured Away from Home but Not on Vacation
Vacation cases like Moki Mac, of course, are just a subset of a much larger
set of cases in which plaintiffs are injured or otherwise harmed away from home.
For example, suppose a resident of Georgia, traveling on business in Maine, slips
and falls in a Walmart store there. Can she sue Walmart in Georgia, where
Walmart has, if not a “veritable truckload of contacts” like Ford, 199 a veritable
warehouse full of them? Will specific jurisdiction be available under Ford’s new
sliding scale? 200 As in Ford, a forum resident sues a defendant with massive
See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021).
See, e.g., Fennell v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 987 N.E.2d 355, 359–60 (Ill. 2012); Stangvik v. Shiley Inc.,
819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., 519 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ohio 1988).
198
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
199
Id. at 1031 (majority opinion).
200
This would have been an easy case for contacts-based general jurisdiction prior to Goodyear and its
progeny. See HAY, supra note 130, at 382–84.
196
197
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forum state contacts. Unlike in Ford, she suffered her injury out of state. Should
that distinction make a difference? Unlike the out-of-state plaintiffs in BMS,
however, she is a resident of the forum. Would that, coupled with Walmart’s
massive physical presence in Georgia, be enough?
For yet another example, suppose one of the Ford plaintiffs had been injured
in a neighboring state while commuting to work there. May he still sue at home?
The only distinction from the actual case is that the injury took place outside the
forum state. Again, would Ford’s “truckload of contacts” plus plaintiff’s
residence provide the requisite “affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy”? 201 Ford describes this as “principally[] [an] activity or occurrence
that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s
regulation.” 202 Does “principally” leave enough wiggle room for jurisdiction
over this case, where the activity took place outside the forum state and not
subject to its regulation?
Speaking of warehouses, suppose our Georgia traveler leaves her hair dryer
at home and her budget motel does not provide one. She gets Amazon to ship
her one overnight. Needless to say, it malfunctions, shocking her severely. May
she sue Amazon at home in Georgia? 203 If not, suppose the hair dryer does not
malfunction until she is back in Atlanta. Now may she sue at home? The Court
expressly did not “consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal
questions of their own.” 204 So, we lack guidance on this massive set of cases,
too.
D. The Buckeye Boiler Scenario
Over fifty years ago, the California Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 205 The facts of the
case suggest a hypothetical that is timely after the decision in Ford. Suppose
Pressure Tank Corporation (PTC) manufactures tanks in which liquid is placed
and put under pressure so it can be sprayed. PTC makes two kinds of tanks, PTC201
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017)).
202
Id. at 1025 (quoting BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1780) (emphasis added).
203
Here we note that in July 2021, Amazon changed its conditions of use for Prime customers. The
conditions provide that customers waive any right to sue Amazon other than in the state or federal courts of King
County, Washington. An earlier iteration required submission to arbitration rather than to court litigation.
Obviously, the enforceability of these terms of use adds a wrinkle to our hypothetical case here, one that is
beyond the scope of this article.
204
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 n.4 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014)).
205
458 P.2d 57, 67 (Cal. 1969).
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1 and PTC-2, which are different sizes and accommodate different amounts of
pressure. Plaintiff is injured when a PTC-2 tank explodes while he is using it to
spray paint his house in State A. PTC routinely sells thousands of PTC-1 tanks
to State A businesses and ships them directly to State A. But PTC has never
marketed the PTC-2 tank in State A. It is unclear how the PTC-2 tank used by
Plaintiff got into State A (except that PTC had no role in its being there). PTC
is not incorporated in State A, nor does it maintain its principal place of business
there. Would State A have personal jurisdiction over PTC for Plaintiff’s claim?
Ford does not answer this question directly. The Court expressly refused to
address a case “in which Ford marketed the models [involved in the wrecks] in
only a different State or region.” 206 It seems to us, however, that the outcome
will depend in part upon how much business PTC does in State A. If the level
of activity would satisfy the “continuous and systematic” test for general
jurisdiction in an earlier era, we know that a lesser showing of relatedness will
suffice to uphold specific jurisdiction. Beyond that, however, notice the factspecific nature of the relatedness analysis. Presumably we would need to know
whether PTC’s activities in the forum include providing service or parts for the
PTC-2 tank. If so, the argument for relatedness is stronger. But is it strong
enough?
E. Redressing the Balance Between Plaintiffs and Defendants?
As we noted at the beginning of this article, Ford is the first personal
jurisdiction case in the last ten years in which the defendants lost. The other six
cases 207 radically cut back the available fora where plaintiffs could obtain
redress for their injuries and, as Justice Gorsuch observed, 208 favor large
corporate defendants, who can easily litigate in any state, over injured
individuals who cannot. The most significant question about Ford is whether it
will be the first of a new set of cases redressing this obvious imbalance between
plaintiffs and defendants.
All three opinions in Ford suggest that the Court is aware that something
must be done to repair this imbalance. 209 But there the agreement stops. If the
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028.
See supra note 2.
208
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). As Justice Gorsuch also noted, the
Court’s three general jurisdiction decisions only benefited corporations. Id. Individuals can still be sued for any
claim where they can be served. Id. General jurisdiction outside the defendant’s home still lives—but just for
individual defendants. Id.
209
Id. at 1022–32 (majority opinion); id. at 1032–34 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1034–
39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text.
206
207
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Court can be persuaded to abandon the International Shoe framework, as the
concurring opinions tease, it could give states far more leeway to provide
convenient fora for their residents. But as Justice Kagan responded to the
concurring Justices, the Court has been proceeding under the International Shoe
framework for over seventy-five years. 210 That is a long time and a lot of
precedents. Precedent matters. At least for now and the foreseeable future, a
majority of the Justices seem unready for a such a radically new approach, the
details of which were not even suggested by the three concurring Justices.
Moreover, the fault lies less with International Shoe than with the cases
misapplying it. International Shoe’s goal was to provide a coherent and
functional basis for expanding personal jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed
by the traditional bases of presence, consent, and domicile, without the
confusing use of legal fictions. International Shoe’s endorsement 211 of Hess v.
Pawloski212 led directly to the original long-arm statutes, all of which asserted
specific jurisdiction over cases “arising from” defendants’ in-state contacts.
Jurisdiction under these statutes remains routinely available in most cases. 213
Additionally, the Court in International Shoe did not restrict general jurisdiction
to where a corporation is “at home.” International Shoe expressly stated that the
minimum-contacts analysis included “an estimate of the inconveniences which
would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home or principal place
of business.” 214 For over sixty-five years, general jurisdiction was an integral
part of the contacts-based system created by International Shoe, and state courts
routinely used it where specific jurisdiction was unavailable. 215
In short, the Court can easily redress the balance between plaintiffs and
defendants within the International Shoe framework, if it has the will to do so.
Goodyear and its progeny are neither faithful to International Shoe nor wellestablished precedents. The Court could candidly confess error and overrule
them or, failing that, use Ford’s sliding scale approach to de facto reinstate
general jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic contacts. It could also
recognize that large corporations, like wealthy individuals, have many states
where they are “at home” and can easily litigate, and require them to litigate
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 n.2.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1945).
212
274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927) (upholding Massachusetts nonresident motorist statute on implied
consent theory).
213
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 140 (4th ed. 2017) (explaining that most long-arm statutes
provide that—or are interpreted to—extend personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit).
214
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arthur &
Freer, supra note 160.
215
HAY, supra note 130, at 382–84.
210
211
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there in all cases. Future decisions could find specific jurisdiction in the fact
patterns that we discuss above, especially if the Court gives adequate weight to
plaintiffs’ legitimate interest in suing at home—and their home states’ legitimate
interest in providing them an adequate forum.
The most significant barrier to the reformulation of specific jurisdiction
doctrine is an irrational solicitude for defendants, either because of abstract
concerns that they should not be governed by states other than their own 216 or
the risk that a host of “little guys” 217 will be summoned to far-away fora. But
individuals injured by defective products are little guys, too, and in most cases
smaller than defendants. 218 The burden of distant litigation in most cases will be
greater for them—and not covered by liability insurance. A sensible system of
jurisdiction would at least put the parties on an equal footing. The fairness
factors already provide “little guy” defendants all the legitimate protection they
deserve. As Justice Brennan explained in Burger King, the fairness factors
would deny jurisdiction where the burden of distant litigation would in fact put
the defendant “at a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent” 219 or
would “for all practical purposes . . . deprive[] [him] of his day in court.” 220
CONCLUSION
Hopefully, Ford signals that the Court is finally beginning to recognize the
constitutional equality of the parties. Inconvenience to one party is usually
convenience (or a strategic advantage) to the other. As Justice Brennan observed
long ago, the minimum-contacts test has long been focused on the relationship
between the defendant and the forum. 221 But Ford, to its great credit, recognizes
that it takes two to tango. We hope that Ford signals an equal appreciation of
the need for plaintiffs to have access to a reasonable forum and the right of a

216
See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (noting that,
in addition to the “practical problems” arising from litigation in the forum, courts must consider “the more
abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State [with] little legitimate interest” in the case).
217
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980) (discussing
hypotheticals involving a local tire retailer, seller of a defective jack, and soft drink concessionaire); see also J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891–92 (2011) (mentioning an “Appalachian potter,” “a small
Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer”).
218
For example, compare the family injured in World-Wide Volkswagen with the Audi dealer that sold
them the allegedly defective car. Most car dealers are surely wealthier than most of their customers.
219
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
220
Id. at 486 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
221
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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defendant to avoid litigation in a forum with which it has little contact. For now,
we must wait and see.

